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Abstract 
 Since the decentralization era that started in 1999, the need to 
search for local identity in various regions in Indonesia gradually emerged. 
Local elites have been pursuing some specific characteristics to legitimize 
their indigeneity and authenticity which are useful to strengthen their local 
power grip. The production of local identity (e.g., adat; tradition) was 
transformed into a key factor for the success of a local government in the 
transition of political and economic power in Indonesia (Bourchier, 2007; 
Erb, 2007). In that cultural production, a particular ethnic tradition was 
often fabricated into a binary dichotomy; “good” and “bad” to come up 
with a “true local identity.” Within this scheme, a tradition considered 
“bad” is rejected. Baram, a traditional Dayak beverage containing alcohol, 
faces this kind of rejection. Even though it is inherently a part of the Dayak 
culture, evidence of its existence is systematically deleted in the public 
domain such as museums, books, and public documents and other local 
publications. Baram is perceived as a form of bad habit and also is thought 
to be irrelevant to the contemporary Dayak identity that is struggling to 
eliminate the stereotype of being uncivilized. This paper argues that the 
marginalization of baram not only is a matter of politics but also is related to 
current social and cultural contestation in Central Kalimantan, 
Palangkaraya in particular. The analysis in this paper focuses on the relation 
of the Dayak as indigenous people of Central Kalimantan and migrants 
from other Kalimantan regions and outside of Kalimantan. The data were 
collected during my short ethnographic research in Palangkaraya and 
Katingan Regency, Central Kalimantan in 2015. Baram is suspected of 
being a source of overconsumption of alcohol that triggers violence and 
criminal actions in both urban and rural communities. Such a formulation 
is common in the mass media to describe the negative effects of baram. The 
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marginalization of baram continues and has escalated into a more serious 
matter as the local regime now labels it as illegal good. It is, thus, alienated 
in its own home. 
Keywords: Baram, Marginalization, Local Identity, Dayak, Indonesia 
 
 
Local identity and how to approach it—an introduction 
This paper is not aimed at discussing the already steady concepts of 
culture and identity. Rather, my purpose here is to challenge the concept of 
local identity that scholars have been used in a taken-for-granted manner in 
examining Indonesia‟s politics in the post-Soeharto era (Bourchier 2007, 
Erb 2007, Henley and Davidson 2007, Tirtosudarmo 2007, Tanasaldy 
2012). Instead of elaborating how elites institutionalize their power using 
local features and traditions, I would like to argue that there is something 
more urgent and deeper than “local identity”: its crafting process itself. 
Local identity, in my opinion, is not something established as it is; 
rather, we should consider it as a series of events of fabrication. As fluid as 
identity concepts can be,2 the local identity for a certain geographical area is 
also always contextual. The local identity puzzles are constructed from 
chosen fragments of tradition that can meet the concept of the nation. On 
the contrary, other traditions—though essential for the local people—are 
marginalized and often suppressed by the local regime due to improper 
impressions. Regrettably, the processes of construction are not always fully 
conscious. Often, the production of local identity for which traditions are 
selected is run under influence of hegemonic values.   
These values consist of religious resilience and an Indonesian version 
of modernity; legacies from the New Order era that are deeply rooted in 
elites‟ minds even though Soeharto‟s regime fell 16 years ago. Values here, 
however, refer to a set of “worth” criteria related to of society—as Graeber 
(2001:3) says, values are ideas about what the people ought to want. The 
values are the criteria by which the people judge which desires are legitimate 
and worthwhile and which are not. Values, thus, are ideas, if not necessarily 
about the meaning of life, then at least about what one could justifiably 
want from it. 
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Through analysis of how the local regime deals with baram (local 
alcoholic beverage), I would like to share the way religious and modern 
values work hegemonically in pushing this traditional beverage to the edge 
of the Central Kalimantan cultural stage. These values somehow have been 
strengthened and reproduced by the presence of migrants in Central 
Kalimantan. What has happened then is a contestation between images 
embodied in the indigenous Dayak way of life and daily customs from the 
outside. The contestation initiated a particular cultural fabrication of a 
binary dichotomy—“good” and “bad”—to synthesize the Dayak “true local 
identity” in facing a new political environment. By this formula, traditions 
that could lead to bad cultural images should be rejected, avoided, or even 
buried. Baram—apparently—is perceived as part of these traditions. I found 
this interesting phenomenon during my short ethnographic research in two 
regions, Palangka Raya City and Katingan Regency.  
Palangkaraya was chosen as a research site for an urban context in 
baram consumption. I include Katingan Regency for studying the rural 
context. In Katingan I visited two areas: 1) Kasongan, 90 minutes from 
Palangkaraya, as a representation of a rural area that affected by modern 
tradition as well as traditional values; 2) Tewang Kadamba and Tumbang 
Liting, two villages which were used to gain pure rural setting of Central 
Kalimantan. 
 
The emerging local regime and production of locality 
From the rubble of Soeharto‟s regime, a new kind of democracy 
emerged. People at that period celebrated the new wave of freedom in 
almost every aspect, particularly in politics (see also Tirtosudarmo 2007, 
Tanasaldy 2012, Li 2000, Sulistiyanto 2006, Davidson and Henley 2007). 
An era of so-called reformation was followed by a political phenomenon 
when 48 parties took part in the 1999 election. Another splendid 
milestone—and the most important—for Indonesia before the transition of 
the millennium was the beginning of decentralization according to Law No. 
22/19993 as a counter to a centralized system that had legally absorbed local 
resources for three decades. 
In this new form of power sharing between Jakarta—the center of 
national power—and other regions, local governments are allowed to 
Sofyan Ansori, The Fabrication of Local Identity 
53 
 
manage their own resources independently and construct their own rules 
autonomously as long as their decisions align with national regulations. 
Elites‟ interest to grip more control in their territories has been met with 
high demand for decent public services, resulting in proliferation of new 
regencies and even new provinces. Kellas (1991 in Tanasaldy, 2012) 
emphasizes the proliferation as a serious implication of decentralization. By 
2015, Indonesia is consisted of into 34 provinces and 514 regencies and 
cities, compared to 27 provinces and 305 regencies and cities in 1998.4 
Politically, the reformation that was also the first time for every 
province, city, and regency to elect leaders by regional election; and it was 
also the first time the Indonesian public was familiarized with the 
propaganda of “native leader” (putera daerah) propaganda. Within this 
system, locality became a new mantra to obtain trust and support in 
elections. Locality then transformed by the elites into economic activities by 
deliberately advocating for local goods, services, merchants, and other 
stakeholders. Furthermore, alongside political and economic situations, 
primordial sentiments were produced and reproduced and traditions 
reinvented—even triggering communal violence or horizontal conflict (see 
Klinken 2002, Klinken (ed.) 2007). Thus, decentralization not only affected 
the political shape but also reformed economic, social, and even cultural 
matters all over Indonesia.5 
These transformations resulted in massive movements for producing 
locality in various regions of Indonesia. The local elites use locality 
discourse for their political purposes, strengthening their power and sealing 
their resources. One of their typical methods is producing or reconstructing 
their locality from existing traditions to claim and reclaim their legacy in 
those areas. Eventually, it becomes normal to see local government 
promoting and even forcing one kind of tradition in their territory as part 
of impression management. Solely from my research experience, I can tell 
that West Sumatera province reactivated its old Nagari system as an act of 
social and cultural rejoicing, taking advantage of decentralization system. I 
can also refer to how the Aceh government forced sharia law—Islamic 
customs—as part of the claim to the region as a Muslim province. Recently, 
Purwakarta elites have believed that they are retrieving their old Sundanese 
customs as guidance for people as well as for tourism. The list of regions 
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applying a similar tactic is quite long, but the point here is that the elites 
surely need to reinvent and reinforce their local identity to preserve the 
throne. 
Since it is important to endorse traditions that people favor in order 
to gain political sympathy, elites then value only those desired by public. In 
this scheme, each cultural manifestation—consciously or not—is scanned and 
selected to meet local people‟s taste and the national outlook. In contrast to 
preferred cultural values or materials, those identified as disgraced 
traditions are intentionally rejected and even criminalized.  
 
Baram as inherent part of Dayak culture 
As what I‟ve mentioned earlier, alongside the propaganda of “native 
leaders” (putera daerah), a notable tradition is often reinvented for such an 
illusive bonding with the local society, even though it generates only 
political sympathy and—more pragmatically—electoral votes. A serious 
consideration is that tradition should not be contrary to the common 
preferences or interests, either local and national. Rather, the chosen 
traditions should enable elites to transfer their ideal: to represent the local 
and to be politically valued in a larger context.6 That is why, even though 
some traditions continue as an inherent part of people‟s lives, traditions 
that are contrary to the common cannot be promoted. This is what 
happened with people in Central Kalimantan and their baram.  
People living along the Katingan and Kahayan Rivers consider 
drinking alcoholic beverages part of their tradition. They have used 
alcoholic beverages since childhood, both modern products and the 
traditional ones. Often, it is the family that introduces this custom. In 
various adat ceremonies, alcoholic beverages, especially baram, are never 
missing. How baram became an inherent part of daily life is shown in the 
following table:   
 
Ritual Baram Function 
Tiwah  
Completeness ceremony for the 
dead 
Ensure the guests stay awake during the 
night since adat forbids people to sleep 
while celebrating tiwah ceremony 
Maja Misek  Used as Rapintuak, part of the offering for 
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Table 1.  Baram functions in Dayak tradition7 (Author‟s field notes, 2015) 
Rite to propose marriage to a 
woman 
the woman‟s families. During traditional 
poetry contest between family groups 
(man and women side), the losing side 
drink the rapintuak, bonding the family 
Nahunan 
Gratitude ceremony over 
child‟s health after delivery 
process. In some cases, also 
conducted when child is ready 
to walk on the land or go to the 
river. 
Offering for ancestors; if the supply is 
plentiful, some can be consumed by 
family members as well 
Menyanggar 
Required rite after a prayer is 
granted.  
Offering for ancestors; put inside the 
patahu (a mini-temple made of wood 
located near the people‟s house) 
Memapas Lewu  
A ceremony to clear a territory 
from bad spirits (usually held 
annually or for special 
occasions) 
Offering for ancestors; poured to the 
ground 
Agricultural Activities  
A set of ceremonies in the 
opening season (preparation of 
the land) and the harvest  
Offering for ancestors to bless the crops; 
consumed by people who contribute in 
preparing/harvesting the land  
Marriage Party 
 
Sign of joy and enhancement of pleasure 
from entertainment; served to every 
guest, including women and children 
Death Ritual Ensure the family and other watching the 
corpse stay awake all night related to the 
common belief that if everyone is 
sleeping, the corpse will rise. 
Curing Ritual Medium used by curer to communicate 
with the ancestors in helping the patient 
as well as an offering for them.  
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Beside its inclusion in every ritual, is also a noble present for guests of 
the house. Normally, whenever a guest visits a Dayak house, baram is served 
as a form of appreciation. When I first went to the house of my informant, 
he acknowledged “…to be honest, baram is supposed to be preserved in 
every single Dayak‟s house. Whenever a guest or an old friend comes to our 
house, we then could serve it well. Unfortunately, baram is getting scarce 
here. Me too, I wish I had it so I can serve it to you.”. Baram as a tradition 
to honor a guest is also mentioned by Tjilik Riwut, founding father of 
Central Kalimantan, in his book Kalimantan Membangun Alam dan 
Kebudayaan (Kalimantan Constructs Nature and Culture):  
It often is done, to appreciate an honored guest, they serve baram. I 
suggest one accept and drink the served baram even if only a sip; do 
not reject it because it is a form of joy and appreciation. If the guest 
rejects the baram and does not taste it even a bit, they would feel 
offended (2007:205). 
 
Serving baram as a form of decency is an undoubted fact of Dayak 
custom. Nevertheless, there is one important detail is that they would not 
serve baram to just any guest. It is common that Dayak would serve baram to 
honorable guests or close allies, and I did experience the custom. In my 
early time visiting my informants, they served me only tea, but gradually, 
after we talked a lot with each other and the hosts felt safe and comfortable, 
and appreciated my presence, they offered me baram. 
Baram is made from fermentation of yeast, rice, sugar, tobacco, and 
organic spices such as pepper, galingale, chili, cinnamon, and other 
materials depending on the taste of the maker.8 The rice and spices are 
threshed before being mixed with the yeast. The yeast mixture is then 
exposed to the sun for approximately two weeks. The dry yeast mixture is 
put into sugared water for roughly half a month. The container cannot be 
opened before the baram is ripe; otherwise, it will be ruined. Some makers 
even have rituals during the production processes, e.g. avoiding acid goods, 
restraining anger, talking about only good things, or praying. 
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Figure 1. The brief steps to produce baram. Normally, baram is produced by old women 
called tambi‟ (grandmother) (Illustration made by the author, 2015). 
After being produced, baram is distributed in a simple manner. The 
makers sell it directly to the customers. Even intermediary parties buy the 
bulk quantities in cash as there is no such thing as a distributor here. Baram 
makers also take orders for rituals and ceremonies, both from inside and 
outside the village. The price of baram varies depending on the region but 
within the range of Rp 10,000-20,000 (1-1.5 USD) per liter. Despite some 
economic potential, baram makers normally do not sell their product to the 
young due to possibilities of alcohol misuse. If something bad happened, 
like criminal or violent acts, the blame would go to the baram makers. They 
do not want to take that risk. 
Furthermore, in the context of alcoholic beverages, elites of Hindu 
Kaharingan9 stated clearly during our interview that their society has never 
understood the norms of alcohol consumption. Drinking baram, 
specifically, until one is drunk, is basically forbidden. Principally, baram is 
used only by pisur or basir (priests)10 to help them communicate with the 
ancestors‟ spirits. In their analogy, the sensation from drinking baram 
should never exceed the sensation from chewing areca nut or tobacco; thus, 
no more than a small glass can be consumed. When baram is consumed 
excessively, it becomes “a devilish potion” that could turn a human being 
into an evil.  
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Meanwhile, in the adat law of Dayak daily life, there is no particular 
regulation that forbids them to drink alcohol—i.e., baram. Any regulations 
are only for cautionary purposes so that their actions would not lead them 
to get singer (a fine). Regardless, baram in the eye of adat elites is an inherent 
part of the life cycle of Dayak. Birth, wedding, and death ceremonies always 
involve baram for both sacred and profane purposes. In the past, when 
Dayak lived deep in the forest, drinking baram before leaving their houses 
or bringing baram as a travel supply was common and even recommended 
to warm the body during activities. When describing baram‟s functions in 
daily file, those adat leaders are frankly against the Hindu Kaharingan elites‟ 
idea. The information from Hindu Kaharingan‟s elites, they argue, does not 
have a solid ground since Hindu Kaharingan and its views are considered to 
contaminate the true Kaharingan‟s precepts since this region has been 
influenced too much by outsiders.  
 
Dayak locality and outsider hegemony 
Outside influences that those elites referred to involve two related 
matters: first, the migration of other ethnic groups to Central Kalimantan; 
and second, hegemonic moral values from the concept of Islam and 
modernity. Two larger groups, the Javanese and Banjarnese, made major 
migrations into Central Kalimantan.11 The waves of Javanese into the area 
occurred through transmigration programs during colonization and the 
New Order era although other moves made by individuals to pursue better 
opportunities also occurred (see Tirtosudarmo, 2007: 176). Meanwhile, 
historically, the Banjarnese shared geographical space with the Dayak before 
the separation of Central Kalimantan and South Kalimantan in 1957.12 
After Central Kalimantan became an independent province, some of the 
Barjarnese have continued to live in the new province and have been 
followed by other groups.   
Dayak in Central Kalimantan consists of several groups, such as 
Ngaju, Ma‟anyan, Katingan, and several others. The Dayak population in 
Central Kalimantan is still unclear, but Ngaju is considered the largest 
Dayak ethnic group in Central Kalimantan due to its mobility in their past 
and that its language is being used as lingua franca among the other groups. 
At a glance, it is easy to imagine that Palangkaraya and Katingan are 
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dominated by Dayak. It is true that in Central Kalimantan Dayak attributes 
can be seen everywhere as part of their identity production, but in fact, it is 
not the Dayak who really run the cities. Based on my observations and 
information gathered, even though the Dayak formally hold the grip on the 
power, economic activities are geared up neither by them nor the Javanese, 
but by their old brothers: migrants from South Kalimantan, the Banjarnese.  
The story of Central Kalimantan cannot be separated from Dayak 
rivalry with the Banjarnese. The foundation of this province was triggered 
by Dayak cultural aspiration to be a more independent. At the time, 
Central Kalimantan was part of South Kalimantan, ruled by the dominant 
ethnic, Banjarnese. The Banjarnese supremacy occupied the economic, 
political, and even socio-cultural aspects of daily life. Dayaknese felt they 
had suffered enough and had a historical claim over their own resources 
and territories (see Tirtosuwarso 2007). Thus, it was only natural for them 
to separate from their old siblings. It was Soekarno himself, the founding 
father of Indonesia, who in 1957 laid the first stone for the new road as 
part of Palangkaraya‟s development as the capital of Central Kalimantan.13 
Decades have passed but still the Dayak cannot get rid of their old 
rival and, contrary to their expectation, Central Kalimantan has been filled 
with Banjarnese due to continuous migration. The dominance of the 
Banjarnese is inevitable, in my opinion, since Palangkaraya‟s supply of 
goods is mostly received and distributed from Banjarmasin, the capital of 
South Kalimantan. Thus, Palangkaraya is highly dependent on its neighbor. 
The Banjarnese are synonymous with trading and are mostly Muslims. 
Unfortunately, there are no reliable sources for the ethnic distribution in 
Central Kalimantan, Palangkaraya, or Katingan. To support my 
observation, I can only present with religious and occupational data. The 
population census in 2010 from the Central Agency on Statistics of 
Indonesia shows that the people in Central Kalimantan are dominantly 
Islam (74%) in religion and traders (35%) in occupation. These data meet 
with the stereotype of Banjarnese in Central Kalimantan, that their culture 
is different from the Dayak.14 The Banjarnese slowly but surely have been 
filling this region and have some way defined a new “style” of living for 
people here. Thus, in the center of activity of Palangkaraya and Katingan, 
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where I conducted my research, Islamic nuance and ambiance are really 
strong. 
Undeniably, Islamic resilience has gotten stronger in every aspect of 
Indonesian life, especially in politics, all over the country. Indonesia has the 
largest Muslim population in the world, with more than 200 million 
people, nearly 88 % of its citizens.15 Therefore, it is only natural for the 
country to be influenced by Islamic values and perspectives. Islamic values 
became a national matter after the Reformation era, when morality 
movements, alongside technological development, and newfound freedom 
could heavily affect the people. Mass Islamic organizations have also been 
playing a significant role in spreading the message of Islamic morality 
through all available media. The dissemination of Islamic messages is a part 
of the contemporary salience of religious movements around the globe. In 
Indonesia, these Islamic morality movements range from the softest, such as 
prayer groups, to the most extreme approaches, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir 
Indonesia. Peculiarly, these movements have also resulted in more conflict-
prone society in which people are more easily annoyed by the presence of 
people with other beliefs, and promoting acts of intolerance. Asad (2003) 
captures this pattern around the globe: “[T]he resurgence of religion has 
been welcomed by many as a means of supplying what they see as a needed 
moral dimension to secular politics and environmental concerns. It has 
been regarded by others with alarm as a symptom of growing irrationality 
and intolerance in everyday life.” 
Besides religious movements, modernization has been at the very 
heart of development in Indonesia since the New Order era, and it has 
played a pivotal part in shaping locality. Modernization, alongside liberal 
economics, has become valued as normal, preferred, and regarded as the 
core that guides regional development in Indonesia, including in Central 
Kalimantan. In discussing development, putting attention on the migrants 
is crucial because they are at once the catalyst and the assurance of 
modernization. Gradually, they have transformed into the backbone of 
modernization in its economic, social, and political aspects. The existence 
of migrants has effectively triggered modernity among the Dayak.  
At a certain point, being modern in Dayak context means that people 
should behave modernly and put away their traditional customs. Being 
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educated in formal institutions, living in a permanent house, using 
electronics, and having a bathroom are among that the attributes of 
modernity. Another aspect is avoiding violent actions such as those that 
occurred in Sampit in bloody ethnic conflict with the Madurans. Although 
violence and other “tribal” actions are avoided, some still occur. Today‟s 
Dayak still collectively intoxicated with baram and other alcoholic beverages, 
especially while participating in various adat ceremonies. The activity 
presents an “uncivilized” image since fighting and other criminal actions are 
often committed by the drunken mass, in both urban and rural areas. 
Furthermore, being modern is also equal to obeying formal regulation. 
Baram as a substance cannot comply with formal regulations in terms of its 
presence and alcohol composition. Modernity combined with religious 
values and the outsiders‟ influences has been progressively internalized into 
every aspect of today‟s Dayak‟s livelihood and affects their ideas about what 
they ought to want. 
 
Repression over baram: fabrication of local identity 
Question: “Do you have baram?” 
Answer: “Yes I do” 
Question: “Who‟s the maker?” 
Answer: “I have no idea. Maybe in that area [referring to rural places]; 
 there is no baram maker nearby.” 
  
During my ethnographic research, conversations like this one were 
typical. People could easily answer where they could find baram if they 
needed it, but they really have no idea who the maker is since the baram is 
supplied from other regions. Palangkaraya‟s citizens usually articulated, 
“…maybe in Katingan, Gunung Mas, or Lamandau” (other regencies, far 
from the city). Ironically, when I asked the same question in Katingan 
Regency, people there stated that they did not have particular information 
about the baram maker‟s presence. Apparently, baram makers have been 
gradually marginalized to peripheral areas. One causal explanation for why 
the number of baram maker has slowly decreased is the local regime‟s 
oppression.  
One point in the local regulation 13/2013 touches on the type of 
alcoholic beverages that are allowed to be circulated in the city. There are 
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three categories based on ethanol content: A for less than 5%; B for 5%-
20%; and C for 20%-45%. Unfortunately, there is no standard for alcohol 
content for baram and it cannot be put into any of these categories; hence 
its circulation is considered illegal. In 2015 alone, police officers have made 
several raids on baram makers in Palangkaraya, including the new case in 
Tangkiling.16 Baram is perceived as a dangerous potion due to the lack of 
alcohol standard and it is labeled as one of the causes of juvenile crimes. 
Making baram for any purpose is prohibited by law. 
An informant, a traditional curer, was one of the raid victims. She 
had been making baram since 1980 for medicinal purposes. Baram, in her 
perspective, is used as a medium to invite the spirit of ancestors essential in 
the curing process. When the local regulation was applied, she stated, she 
got raided twice. The first time, around three years ago, she was only 
warned not to make baram any longer but was not arrested. In the second 
raid, there were more police officers that combed her house for tools and 
equipment. She was then brought to the police‟s office. Recalling the 
experience, she said, “I don‟t know what‟s wrong, they only said that „You should 
not make baram!‟ „You do not have a permit!‟ After the raid, I never made baram 
anymore. She added in a cynical tone “it‟s alright.” At her trial, the judge 
punished her with a fine of around IDR 1,000,000 (USD 75) and a 
prohibition against making baram. She told me that she once asked for a 
permit several years ago so that she could make and distribute baram legally. 
She was rejected because her baram did not have a standard for alcohol 
content. After the rejection, she continued to produce baram to answer the 
demand from the people who need it for medicinal purposes. 
This kind of legal ambush is not unique to Palangkaraya. The terror 
was also experienced by people in Kasongan, Katingan. Both the makers 
and the distributors of baram were caught and warned. One of my 
informants expressed that even if he had baram in stock, he could not sell it 
to anyone and would give it only to familiar persons. Police officers often 
camouflage themselves as a strategy to capture the “criminals.” Even in the 
stores where we gathered for group interview, the seller looked very cautious 
and served baram only to people he already knew. 
I found a similar situation in Tewang Kadamba, a baram maker village 
in Katingan regency. During my first visit, the wife of the village head 
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looked terrified whenever we approached the topics of baram. She 
persistently stated that no one produced baram in the village at that time 
and she really did not have any idea of who was still making it on a daily 
basis. Although I met with the village head the next day, the producers were 
afraid of getting caught by the police as if I were one of them. When the 
village head finally came with baram he articulated, “…the grandma [baram 
maker] was afraid, if it was not me [a village head], she would never give her 
baram.” Thirty minutes from Kasongan, Katingan, a baram maker in 
Kerengpangi was more worried than frightened. She even asked me to 
guarantee her business so that the police could not touch her. I obviously 
could not produce that kind of statement for her. The form of government 
repression through the police institution is aligned with their effort to wipe 
out the alcohol tradition in Central Kalimantan. In public documents 
about culture, especially the government version, baram is something that 
never existed; its appearance is purposely obscured. 
My suspicion about the regime‟s effort to hide baram‟s existence 
began when I visited Museum Balanga—a place dedicated to being an 
information center for Dayak culture in Central Kalimantan. Among the 
numerous displayed posters, portraits, sculptures, miniatures, and other 
items, not a single one of them talked specifically about baram. Nonetheless, 
baram could easily be identified in photographs of the Dayak life cycle. In 
one poster describing a ceremony (see figure 2), baram was clearly presented 
but not even once was there an explanation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A poster in Museum Balanga, Palangkaraya, shows an offering in a Dayak‟s 
ceremony. Baram is clearly identifiable (two glasses in yellow circles), but there is no 
explanation about its presence (photographed by the author, 2015). 
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I reviewed several books and museum items, looking for information 
about traditional alcoholic beverages. I found almost nothing, which was 
interesting. I got the impression that the local regime was “too ashamed” to 
provide a portrait of an alcohol-consumption tradition among Dayak 
people. In the book Tiwah dan Perlengkapannya (Tiwah and its Instruments; 
2003) the Tiwah ceremony and items used in it are pictured and described, 
including a buffalo horn which is used ultimately to drink the baram. 
Ironically, there is no mention of baram. This presentation is certainly very 
different from what I learned from people and local figures: that baram is 
always a part of ceremonies, especially Tiwah.  
Even in the book Adat Istiadat Dayak Ngaju (The Customs of Dayak 
Ngaju; 2003) information about baram is lacking. Nevertheless, whenever I 
talked with Dayak Ngaju people, baram is described as something common 
and significantly integrated with their daily activities. From my investigation 
of books in the local public library, I could not stop myself from 
constructing the hypothesis that information about traditional alcoholic 
beverages among the people had been intentionally concealed. The local 
regime seemed to be avoiding a public image that Dayak is identical with 
alcohol or drinking activities. Moreover, in government published books 
and documents, baram and other alcoholic beverages are alleged to be 
“negative elements” that people need to abandon. Yet, baram‟s existence in 
cultural ceremonies is inevitable and people tend to consume it excessively 
and become intoxicated. Perhaps this tendency of excessive consumption is 
the reason that the government does not acknowledge the presence of 
alcoholic beverages, especially baram, in cultural descriptions about Dayak 
in Central Kalimantan. 
I believe this kind of treatment over baram is related to how 
modernization is articulated by the local elite to become the moral 
standard. As mentioned by Maunati (2004:310), being a modern people—or 
at least perceived as modern—is politically necessary, especially when linked 
to the well-known “tribal” and “distant” Dayak. Modernity is then an 
achieved label in order to overcome the stereotype of them as being 
uncivilized. In doing so, they need acknowledgment that they deserve to be 
equal to the rest of the republic. Thus they show their local traditions 
publicly, traditions that have been processed for political purposes. 
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Utilizing locality is not particularly new in politics. Internationally, 
the use of local identity as a means on the political stage has been widely 
applied, especially in power transition from one regime to the another (see 
Goodman 2002; Sulistiyanto 2006). I believe the locality production in 
Central Kalimantan has been influenced by Islamic and modern values that 
have spread both nationally and locally. These values affect local elites‟ 
actions in decision-making process related to their political maneuvers using 
indigenous attributes—although this viewpoint needs further investigation. 
In a hegemonic way, these values have shaped binary categories regarding 
cultural heritage. Baram, which contains alcohol, apparently has been 
labeled as a bad tradition that triggers a lot of social problems.  
It must be acknowledged that the need to construct local identity 
derives from a combination of an indigeneity movement and a political 
campaign. That is why a produced identity should be folkloric enough to 
serve a role in locality‟s promotional material and at the same time strong 
enough to grab mass attention. The case of Central Kalimantan reflects a 
set of rediscovered tangible traditions perceived as exotic that represent the 
indigeneity on the one side and to accommodate dominant migrant interest 
on the other. Thus, local identity is indeed fabricated. 
 
Conclusion 
Baram is not the only tradition experiencing marginalization. Other 
examples include repression of Mentawai‟s tattoo, Banyumas‟ calung and 
lengger, Chinese traditions, and many other traditions considered dangerous 
for social harmony and stability of the state. The repression against 
undesired customs itself has been happening in Indonesia, just like 
occurred to In this matter, Jones (2013) explains that the “development” 
discourse during the New Order‟s peak time between 1970 and 1980 
indeed presented “underdeveloped” people and their traditions—including 
communist related entities—as burdensome and needing to be governed.17 
Although aimed at local tradition, this institutional repression was part of 
the political supremacy of the regime to the local politics. From his 
observation in West Kalimantan, Tanasaldy (2012: 25) draws a solid 
description of how local politics suffered during the Soeharto era:  
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Politic of Dayaks… has always been constrained by the nature of the 
regime. Under such a regime, ethnic politics, which are often linked 
with regional politics or even separatist movements, is repressed 
because it is perceived as a threat to national unity. Under repressive 
systems, most ethnic groups and their elites have no other options 
except pledging loyalty to the regime. 
 
What is so different in baram‟s case is that other customs had the 
chance to be publicly presented as local wisdom and even a matter of local 
pride. Baram, ironically, has been continuously suppressed even though the 
regime has changed since the early 2000s. This marginalized baram story is 
the beginning way to understand the construction of a local identity. By 
presenting this case, I would like to contribute to the local identity debate 
by stressing the question of “what” rather than “how” and “why.” The 
“what” about local identity is essential, in general, to add to earlier studies 
that tend to use local identity without proper elaboration of the concept 
itself (see Maunati 2004, Bourchier 2007, Erb 2007, Henley and Davidson 
2007, Tirtosudarmo 2007, Tanasaldy 2012). Although the relation among 
Islamic movement, modernity, and migrants‟ presence, needs to be 
elucidated further, it is clear that a set of values has had significant role in 
shaping elites‟ decision in the process of local identity fabrication.   
 
 
Endnotes: 
                                                            
1 Institution: Center for Anthropological Studies, Universitas Indonesia Email: 
sofyan.ansori@gmail.com Phone: +6285694792494 
2 My argument here supports Hall‟s (1990) opinion “…identities are always about 
becoming, as well as being, but are never simply invented… cultural identities [then]… come 
from somewhere, have histories. But far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised 
past, they are subject to the continuous „play‟ of history, culture and power” (in Li, 2000: 
4). 
3 Effective January 1, 2001; the law itself was revised into Law no. 32/2004. 
4 Visit www.bps.go.id for further information and recent numbers. 
5 There are many examples of how decentralization reshaped political, economic, 
and social stature in Indonesia. See Tanasaldy 2012 for West Kalimantan; Erb 2007 for 
Western Flores; Sangaji 2007 for Central Sulawesi; for other changes in Indonesia see 
Davidson and Henley (eds.) 2007 The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics. 
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6 Goodman (2002) captures how local elites in Shanxi Province, People‟s Republic 
of China, activated local traditions to grab political power as well as to promote the 
region‟s economy. In practice, the elites used the traditions differentially according to the 
level of administration: national, provincial, and smaller. 
7 These limited lists of my findings during a short period of ethnographic research. 
Nonetheless, they show the significant position of baram in Dayak‟s daily life. I believe 
there are more sacred rituals and various profane occasions in which baram is served. 
8 Basically, there are two different kinds of baram. In the upstream region the main 
material is rice and the result called baram bari (rice baram), while in the downstream 
region, the main substance is sugared water. This paper, however, refers to the later. The 
ingredients to produce baram could vary further, depending on the makers‟ creativity. 
9 The religious system of indigenous Dayak is called “Kaharingan,” meaning life. The 
name of Kaharingan was crafted by Dayak elite figures when they dealt with other religious 
identities such as Islam, Catholic, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist. Dayak people have no 
name for their belief—they often refer their way of life as “religion of the past” or “religion 
of ancestor.” In the Soeharto era, this way of life was not considered formal religion. 
Rather, the government perceived Dayak indigenous belief as a sectarian thus allowed 
other religious institutions to preach on them. The Dayak religious elites then lobbied the 
government and agreed to be merged with Hindu. The need to construct the formal 
religious institution was intended to protect the indigenous people from other religions‟ 
penetration. Hindu-Kaharingan, the official name for them, became a win-win solution for 
the Dayak to be acknowledged by the government (officially in 1980). After that moment, 
the religious elites started to build Hindu-Kaharingan institutions such as the prayer, holy 
book, and holy building. These sacred attributes, including the well-known symbol of 
“Batang Haring,” have never been existed before. I collected this story from a senior leader 
of Hindu-Kaharingan in June 2015. For detailed description and analysis of Hindu-
Kaharingan, see Mahin, 2009. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The migrants in Central Kalimantan are not exclusive to Java and Banjar. 
Actually, there are also other ethnics from various regions such as Melayu, Bugis, and 
Madura. However, compared to Java and Banjar, their number is not significant 
(Tirtosudarmo, 2007: 173) 
12 Ibid. 
13 Klinken (2006) illustrates that remarkable moment: “President Sukarno traveled 
up the mighty Kahayan River of Central Borneo with a convoy of boats to lay the first 
stone for Palangkaraya, capital of the new province of Central Kalimantan… for thirty-six 
hours, all along the river, according to a serialized report in a major Jakarta daily, villagers 
came out in their canoes to greet the president and shout „Merdeka!‟ „ Freedom!‟ They had 
only seen the president before in pictures sold on the riverboat.” 
14 Tirtosuwarso 2007 describes that Central Kalimantan indeed dominated by 
Banjarnese—roughly 24% of the total population based on 2000 census.  
15 See Pew Research Center, Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 
2009. 
16 This news was presented in a local newspaper, Palangka Post, with title “Polsek 
Bukit Batu Bongkar Pabrik Pembuatan Baram”  http://www.palangkapost.com/?p=3392 
17 This idea was strongly influenced by Indonesian technocrats at that time to create 
pro-development discourse. Moertopo—the author of Strategi Kebudayaan (1978) for 
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instance—suggests that Indonesian people should be modernized to achieve development 
goals. For detail explanation, please visit Jones (2013) chapter 4. 
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